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Abstract—Illicit crypto-mining leverages resources stolen from
victims to mine cryptocurrencies on behalf of criminals. While
recent works have analyzed one side of this threat, i.e.: web-
browser cryptojacking, only commercial reports have partially
covered binary-based crypto-mining malware.
In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of crypto-
mining malware to date, analyzing approximately 4.5 million
malware samples (1.2 million malicious miners), over a period
of twelve years from 2007 to 2019. Our analysis pipeline applies
both static and dynamic analysis to extract information from the
samples, such as wallet identifiers and mining pools. Together
with OSINT data, this information is used to group samples into
campaigns. We then analyze publicly-available payments sent
to the wallets from mining-pools as a reward for mining, and
estimate profits for the different campaigns. All this together is
is done in a fully automated fashion, which enables us to leverage
measurement-based findings of illicit crypto-mining at scale.
Our profit analysis reveals campaigns with multi-million earn-
ings, associating over 4.4% of Monero with illicit mining. We
analyze the infrastructure related with the different campaigns,
showing that a high proportion of this ecosystem is supported by
underground economies such as Pay-Per-Install services. We also
uncover novel techniques that allow criminals to run successful
campaigns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mining is a key component responsible for the wealth of
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. This process requires a
network of interconnected miners to solve a complex math-
ematical problem in order to link blocks and maintain the
integrity of the transactions. In exchange, miners receive an
amount of the mined cryptocurrency as a reward.
The high value of cryptocurrencies has attracted a large
number of malicious actors that use hijacked resources to mine
these currencies. The illicit crypto-mining threat has grown
considerably over the recent years [1], and it is considered
one of the top-most cybersecurity threats, even surpassing
ransomware according to recent reports [2].
Illicit crypto-mining is typically conducted using either one
of these two modes: (i) by using browser-based crypto-
mining programs (dubbed cryptojacking [3]), where the min-
ing process is run in scripts (typically JavaScript) embed-
ded in web content; or (ii) by using binary-based crypto-
mining malware, where the mining process is embedded in the
payload of a malware running in infected machines that are
*A shorter version of this paper appears in the 2019 ACM Internet
Measurement Conference (IMC). This is the full version.
connected to the Internet. In both cases, by using hundreds of
hijacked machines, perpetrators can obtain a hash-rate similar
to medium-sized mining farms. Each mode has different char-
acterizing features and unique challenges, specially when it
comes to devising effective countermeasures. For example, in
browser-based cryptojacking the damage ceases when the vic-
tim stops browsing the site. Also, users can reduce the threat
by restricting the use of JavaScript. Meanwhile, crypto-mining
malware entails classical malware-related challenges, such as
persistence and obfuscation. Also, since mining increases the
CPU load, thus reducing the computer’s performance, it might
be noticed by end-users. Thus, we observe a new paradigm
aimed at evading user- rather than AntiVirus-detection using
techniques such as idle mining (mining only when the CPU
is idle) or reducing CPU consumption when monitoring tools
(e.g., Task Manager) are running. For readers unfamiliar with
the topic, we refer to the Background section in §II for an
introduction to cryptocurrency mining and its threats.
Motivation. While illicit crypto-mining has been less notori-
ous than other threats such as ransomware, it poses nonetheless
an important threat to users and organizations; and its presence
is an indicator of weaknesses in security practices that must
be addressed [4]. First, the profits generated by their miners
introduce massive incomes to cyber-criminals. These incomes
fuel the underground economy and gear other cyber-criminal
activities [5]. Second, this threat causes important economical
loses to their victims. By draining the CPU-usage, corpora-
tions see how their electricity bills increase and how their
hardware rapidly deteriorates [2], [6]. Finally, this indirectly
causes a non-negligible environmental footprint [7]. Due to
these concerns, browser-based crypto-mining has been widely
studied recently, both analyzing it as a crime [8], [9], [10],
[11] and as an alternative business model to monetize web
content [12], [13], [14]. However, the literature lacks of a
systematic approach to measure the binary-based mining threat
at scale.
The first and only seminal work putting this threat in
perspective is from 2014 [15]. Authors analyzed 2K malware
samples mining Bitcoin and their methodology relied on the
analysis of public transactions. However, there has been a sig-
nificant increase in the number of malware samples monetizing
this threat since 2014 [1], [16]. Also, criminals’ attention has
shifted to other cryptocurrencies, mainly motivated by: i) the
proliferation of ASIC mining, which uses dedicated hardware
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and renders the use of desktop computers no longer profitable
for mining bitcoins, and ii) the development of protocols that
provide transaction anonymity (such as those used in Zcash
or Monero). Anonymous currencies are used by criminals to
thwart traceability and they are on demand in underground
markets. Commercial reports, in the form of blog posts [16],
[3] or white papers [4] provide a further, but limited, view
of the magnitude of the problem and the landscape. Security
firms have analyzed isolated cases of decontextualized mining
operations [17], [18]. However, these studies are limited by
the simplicity of the analysis.
In this paper, we aim to bridge these gaps by addressing
the following research questions: (1) What are the preferred
cryptocurrencies mined by criminals? (2) How many actors are
involved in this ecosystem and what are their profits? (3) What
is the level of sophistication used in different campaigns and
how does this affect the earnings? (4) What is the role of
underground markets and what are the tools and techniques
adopted from them? (5) How can we improve current coun-
termeasures and intervention approaches? Due to potential
ethical concerns arisen from this work (see Appendix), we
obtained approval from our REB office.
Novelty. Our work focuses on crypto-mining malware. By
looking at a wide-range of underground communities, where
knowledge and tools are shared, we have observed increased
interest in this malware. This suggests that cybercrime com-
moditization plays a key role in the wealth of illicit crypto-
mining. We design a measurement pipeline to automatically
analyze malware samples observed in the wild and to extract
information required to identify the miners and pools, using
both dynamic and static analysis. Then, we build a graph-based
system that aggregates related samples into campaigns based
on a series of heuristics. The system is designed to distinguish
campaigns using third-party infrastructure such as Pay-Per-
Install (PPI) services or binary obfuscators. This allows to
analyze to what extent this threat is sustained by different
underground markets [5]. Our analysis system enables the
research community to leverage crypto-mining measurements
at scale.
Findings. Among others, our main findings include:
1) Monero (XMR) is by far the most popular crypto-
currency among cyber-criminals in underground economies
(§IV-B). Considering only crypto-mining malware, our profit
analysis shows that criminals have mined over 4.37% of the
circulating XMR. Although this depends on when criminals
cash-out their earnings, we estimate that the total revenue
accounts for nearly 58M USD. These criminal earnings should
be added to estimations from parallel work focused on
browser-based cryptojacking (§VII).
2) Campaigns that use third-party infrastructure (typically
rented in underground marketplaces) are more successful.
However, this is not always the case. Some of the most
profitable campaigns rely on complex infrastructure that also
uses general-purpose botnets to run mining operations with-
out using third-party infrastructure. Here, we discover novel
malware campaigns that are previously unknown to the com-
munity (e.g., the code-named Freebuf or the USA-138
campaign presented as case studies in §V). Moreover, only
some criminals keep their infrastructure updated, for example
when they are banned in mining pools or when the mining
software needs to be updated due to changes in the mining
algorithm.
3) Campaigns use simple mechanisms to evade detection,
like using domain aliases to contact mining pools (which
prevents simple blacklisting approaches), or idle mining.
4) There are other criminals running successful campaigns
with minimal infrastructure. A common yet effective ap-
proach is to use legitimate infrastructure such as Dropbox
or GitHub to host the droppers, and stock mining tools
such as claymore and xmrig to do the actual mining.
We also show what are the most popular Monero mining
pools (crypto-pool, dwarfpool and minexmr) among
criminals and discuss the role of these and other pools when
devising countermeasures.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
presents the largest systematic study of malicious binary-based
crypto-mining. Our main contributions are:
1) We analyze and describe the role of underground com-
munities for the proliferation of the illicit crypto-mining
business (§II).
2) We present a system that uses both static and dynamic
analysis to extract relevant mining-related information
from crypto-mining malware, such as wallet addresses
and pool domains (§III). Our system uses different tech-
niques to aggregate related samples into larger campaigns
represented as a graph that is then mined for further
analysis. Additionally, we feed the system with infor-
mation gathered from various Open-Source Intelligence
(OSINT) repositories to further classify and analyze the
campaigns.
3) We present a longitudinal study of the crypto-mining
malware threat using data spanning over more than a
decade (§IV and §V). Then, by focusing on Monero,
we rely on information gathered from mining pools to
measure the earnings gained by each campaign. We also
analyze the infrastructure used by criminals and extract
the attribution to stock mining software.
4) We propose a number of countermeasures, and discuss
the efficacy of existing ones together with the open chal-
lenges (§VI). Then, we contextualize the most important
findings of our study with respect to relevant works in
the area (§VII).
Finally, to foster research in the area, we release our dataset
in our online repository.1 We encourage readers to visit this
repository as it provides a wider presentation of the measure-
ments left out of this paper due to space constraints.
1https://github.com/gsuareztangil/cryptomining-malware
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II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first provide an overview of the crypto-
currency mining process. Then we describe the underground
economy supporting the illicit crypto-mining threat.
Cryptocurrency Mining. Cryptocurrencies are a type of
digital assets that can be exchanged in online transactions.
These transactions are grouped into blocks and added to a
distributed database known as the blockchain. Each block is
linked to its previous block. Addition of new blocks to the
blockchain is done by voluntary miners. These must compute
a cryptographic hash of the block, which includes complex
mathematical puzzle known as ‘Proof-of-Work’ (PoW). As a
reward, miners receive a certain amount of the currency. The
mining process maintains the integrity of the blockchain and
it is at the core of all cryptocurrencies.
The increased value of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin
or Ethereum leads to the growth of mining farms using
specialized hardware known as ASICS. Thus, mining these
cryptocurrencies using end-user machines such as laptops or
desktop computers was useless. However, in 2014 a new
PoW known as Cryptonote required not only CPU power
but also memory, turning ASIC-based mining inefficient and
thus gaining again the attention of individuals willing to mine
with their home machines. Additionally, the mining algorithm
changes periodically, thus discouraging ASIC development
(which is optimized for specific algorithms) [19]. Examples
of cryptocurrencies using Cryptonote as PoW are: Monero
(XMR) and Bytecoin (BCN).
When a new block is added to the blockchain, only the first
miner being able to mine the block will get the reward. This
turns the mining process into a race where speed is the hashrate
of a miner. The higher the hashrate, the higher the probability
of mining a block and thus getting the reward. Accordingly,
mining is typically done using public mining pools, which can
be viewed as partnership services between various workers
where the complexity of the mining challenge is distributed
among the partners. Each partner contributes with a given
hashrate aimed at solving the puzzle, and when the pool
successfully mines a block, the reward is divided among the
partners proportionally to their hashrate. In order to get this
reward, workers must provide some form of identification.
This can be proprietary site-keys, like in the case of CoinHive
(the major provider of browser-based mining services), emails
or wallet addresses. The communication between each miner
and the pool is done by using Stratum, which is a de-facto
TCP based protocol evolved from the getwork protocol [20].
Crypto-mining malware and cryptojacking. Crypto-curren-
cy mining is a rather easy monetization technique using
hardware resources. However, it requires an investment in
equipment and also entails a cost in terms of energy. In illicit
cryptomining, criminals make use of their victims’ computing
resources to mine cryptocurrencies on their behalf. This threat
exists since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, but it has increased
since 2014 due to the inception of Cryptonote and other PoW
algorithms resistant to ASIC-based mining.
Illicit crypto-mining is performed by using two techniques:
browser-based or binary-based mining. In the former, the
mining payload is embedded in web resources which are
executed by client browsers without the explicit consent of
the users [9], [8]. In the latter, the payload is distributed in
the form of malware.
The Underground Economy. Underground markets play a
key role in the business of malicious crypto-mining. Users
with few technical skills can easily acquire services and
tools to set up their own mining campaign. Forums are also
used for sharing knowledge. To put our study in context,
we have analyzed a dataset of posts collected from various
underground forums [21], looking for conversations related to
crypto-mining. We observe that crypto-mining malware can be
easily purchased online, for a few dollars (e.g., the average cost
for an encrypted miner for Monero is 35$). In particular, we
have seen an online service which allow to create customized
binaries (e.g., for a particular cryptocurrency and/or a given
pool) to mine cryptonote based currencies, for $13.2 It pro-
vides several stealthy-related techniques such as idle mining
or the use of execution-stalling code [22] targeted to certain
conditions (e.g., when the Task Manager is running). Other
providers opt to share their miners for free, in exchange for a
donation: “Miner is free, we charge a fee of 2% to cover the
time coding.” Figure 1 shows a longitudinal analysis of posts
related to crypto-mining in these forums. Here, we show that
Monero is the most prevalent currency nowadays.
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Fig. 1: Evolution of the number of threads from underground
forums related to mining of different cryptocurrencies.
We also observed that a common topic of conversation
concerns (i) “friendly” pools, i.e.: pools that do not generally
ban users displaying botnet-like behaviors, or (ii) how to
remain undetected otherwise. For instance, users claim that a
good trade-off between profitable hash-rates and a long-lasting
mining strategy is using botnets with less than 2K bots. For
2For ethical reasons we do not disclose the URL of this service
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bigger botnets, many discussions and tutorials explain how to
configure proxies and provide advice on how to reduce the risk
of being exposed: “The best option is to use a proxy and you
can use any pool. Contact me for PM, I am willing to help”.
Also, we found various conversations with users looking for
partners and offering custom (private) mining pools: “In my
pool there is no ban by multiple connections.”
Finally, we note that it is also possible to purchase all-you-
need packages, including tools and services, with a guarantee
period and maintenance (e.g., re-obfuscation when the miner is
detected, or updates to new versions). For the curious reader,
Figure 2 shows a flyer posted in one of the underground
markets, which offers a full Monero botnet.
Fig. 2: Crypto-mining package offered in an underground fo-
rum, including botnet setup, XMR miner and proxy. Permanent
link: https://perma.cc/4FN8-B98M.
Take-Away: The support offered by underground communities
to criminals explains the sharp growth on the amount of
malware monetizing their victims. This motivates the need
for a longitudinal measurement of this threat. We show that
Monero is currently the most discussed crypto-mining coin by
underground forum users.
III. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
A general overview of the measurement methodology is
presented in Figure 3. For the sample collection, we query
both public and private repositories of malware and different
intelligence feeds as described in §III-A. We make a number
of sanity checks for each sample to ensure that we only feed
crypto-mining malware to our pipeline (see §III-B). We also
collect OSINT related to running botnets and relevant Indica-
tors of Compromise (IoCs) observed in malware samples.
A key phase in our pipeline is to analyze relevant samples
both statically and dynamically as described in §III-C (Binary,
Sandbox, and Network Analysis in Figure 3). The goal of this
multi-step phase is to extract the following information from
each miner: (i) the pool or address which the crypto-mining
malware connects to for mining, and the identifier used to
authenticate themselves into this pool, (ii) the addresses of
the e-wallets where mined cryptocoins are paid to3, which
in most cases coincide with the identifier, (iii) URLs where
the malware connects to or is seen at, and (iv) other metadata
obtained from intelligence feeds such as when the sample was
first seen or related samples (e.g., dropped binaries).
The next step is to analyze the mining pools that the miners
work with. We decouple connections made to proxies (that in
turn connect to pools) from the connections to the actual pools.
We then look at the profit reported by each of the wallets in a
pool. These two steps are described in §III-D and are referred
to as Profit Analysis in Figure 3.
Finally, we aggregate related samples into campaigns and
analyze them separately in the Aggregation step as described
in §III-E. For this, we create a graph which interconnects
crypto-mining malware that: (i) share a common execution
ancestor (i.e., dropper) or are packed together, (ii) accumu-
late their earnings into the same wallet, (iii) share common
infrastructure (e.g., proxies or hosting servers), or (iv) relate
to the same IoC related with mining campaigns — gathered
both from OSINT reports and our own investigation. We then
enrich every interconnected sub-graph (campaign) to include
details about related infrastructure used in each campaign (i.e.,
stock mining software or Pay-Per-Install services).
A. Data Gathering
We collect malware samples, metadata and OSINT infor-
mation, and known mining tools from various sources.
Malware. We rely on public and private feeds from:
1) Virus Share. This is an online community that shares
torrents to malicious binaries. We use it to gather our
initial dataset of raw binaries.
2) Virus Total. This is an online service containing both
publicly and privately available services to the security
community through an API (Application Programming
Interface). This service is a subsidiary of Google that runs
multiple AntiVirus (AV) engines and offers an unbiased
access to resulting reports. We use the private API to
download malware binaries. We then query the public
3The terms address and wallet are used interchangeably in the literature.
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Fig. 3: Overview of our processing pipeline and measurement methodology.
API to obtain relevant threat intelligence (which we refer
to as metadata in the paper). In particular, we collect
metadata from the samples obtained through queries
to Virus Total, but also from all the samples obtained
through other sources listed in this section.
3) Hybrid Analysis. This is an online community pro-
viding malicious binaries and threat intelligence obtained
from static and dynamic analysis of the samples. Thus, we
use this community to fetch readily available intelligence
when possible.
4) Other Sources. We have developed a crawler to fetch
samples from a variety of online communities such as
malc0de.com or vxvault.net. Our pipeline also aggregates
malware feeds from cybersecurity companies. For the
purpose of this paper, we have received feeds from Palo
Alto Networks with miners known to them.
Refer to Appendix C for details about the dataset overlaps.
Metadata. When available, we primarily rely on the following
metadata to put our study in context: (i) the first time the
sample was seen in the wild, (ii) the URLs where the sample
was seen, (iii) the list of parents that are known to have
dropped the binary under analysis, and (iv) the list of contacted
domains.
Stock Mining Software. We also collect binaries from known
mining frameworks, such as xmrig4 or xmr-stak5, that are
hosted in various public repositories. While these binaries are
not badware per se, their usage is deemed malicious when run
by malware. Our assumption is that the usage of proprietary
software to mine is not the norm. Anecdotal evidence observed
during the course of a preliminary investigation has shown that
miscreants rely on legitimate — open-source — mining tools.
The modus operandi of the malware is to fetch one of these
tools (i.e., acting as a dropper) and run it in infected machines.
Mining is configured with the wallet of the miscreant, where
4https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig
5https://github.com/fireice-uk/xmr-stak
the rewards are paid by the network. One of our goals then
is to understand if this assumption holds true and how many
campaigns are using stock mining software illicitly.
Summary. Our data collection registers over 4.5 million
samples (see §IV-A for a breakdown), which have been active
between early 2007 and early 2019. This includes about 1K
versions of known mining tools from 13 different frameworks.
Our initial data contains a wide-range of samples, many of
which are irrelevant to this study (e.g., web-based cryptojack-
ers). Thus, we next describe the rules we use to consolidate
the dataset where we report our findings with.
B. Sanity Checks
One important aspect when systematizing the analysis of
malware is properly curating the dataset [23]. We perform
the following sanity checks for each sample processed: (i) is
it malware? (ii) is it a miner?, and (iii) is it an executable
sample?
First, we rely on Virus Total reports to learn if a sample is
malware. Virus Total have been shown to perform remarkably
well when providing malware feeds according to a recent
comparative analysis of Threat Intelligence [24]. In particular,
Virus Total was able to detect 99.94% of the threats over one of
the largest non-targeted6 malware aggregators. We assume that
a sample is malware if at least 10 AV vendors flag the sample
as malicious. While this is a common practice in other works
in the area [25], [26], [27], we acknowledge that having a solid
ground-truth is essential (see discussion in §VI). Thus, we use
a white-list with the hashes of known mining tools, to ensure
that they are not considered as malware samples in our study.
This white-list is compiled from binaries collected from var-
ious online open-source repositories. A wallet extracted from
a malware sample is considered an ‘illicit’ wallet throughout
6Meaning that they target malware threats to generic platforms. Other
targeted malware aggregators focus on threats that specifically target platforms
like Facebook and “that are not as relevant to most Virus Total users” [24].
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our dataset. Therefore, we exceptionally keep samples with
less than 10 AV positives when it contains an illicit wallet.
Second, we assume a malware is a crypto-mining tool when
there are IoCs that reveal activity related to mining, such
as connections made through the Stratum protocol or DNS
resolutions for web mining pools. To this end, we apply
publicly available YARA rules7 to our samples. Additionally,
we compare OSINT information related to known mining
campaigns with IoCs extracted from the samples (e.g., file
hashes or network data). We also use advanced queries from
Virus Total and Hybrid Analysis to look for malware that
meet the following criteria: (i) samples that contact domains
of known mining pools, (ii) communicate through the Stratum
protocol, and (iii) are labeled as “Miner” (or related variants)
by more than 10 AVs.
Finally, to understand whether a malware is executable, we
rely the magic number from its header, and consider only those
related to executables like PE, ELF or JARs. §VI provides
discussion of the limitations behind these assumptions.
C. Extraction of Pools and Wallets
With our dataset of crypto-mining malware, we rely on:
1) Static Analysis: we perform binary inspection to extract
evidences of mining activity embedded into the binary.
2) Dynamic Analysis: we then use environmental informa-
tion obtained from the execution of the binary in a
sandbox. Specifically, we obtain the network traffic, the
dropped files, processes opened, and command line pa-
rameters passed to the binaries. When available, we rely
on reports provided by Virus Total and Hybrid Analysis
through their API service.
In some cases we are able to find identifiers (e.g., wallets or
emails) and pool names using static analysis. In other cases, we
rely on dynamic analysis to extract these identifiers from the
network activity or the command line processes. In both cases,
we process the output of these two analyses using heuristics
and regular expressions to extract the following information:
Cryptocurrency wallets. Miners connect to the pools using
the Stratum protocol [20]. Upon connection to the pool, they
send a request-for-work packet with the identifier of the miner
in a ‘login’ parameter. This identifier can be extracted from
the command line options passed to the mining tool or directly
from the network traffic. We also process the type of wallet
to understand the cryptocurrency (e.g.: Monero, Bitcoin or
Ethereum) the malware is intending to mine.
Mining pools. We collect additional information such as
domains and IPs of mining pools and proxies. Similarly to
wallet addresses, this information is typically extracted from
either the command line of the process invoking the mining
tool or from the network traffic. Typically, miners connect to
a known pool.8 In some cases, the miner either uses a proxy
7https://github.com/Yara-Rules
8We consider known pools as those listed in public sources, e.g.: http:
//moneropools.com/ or http://www.blockchain.com/pools.
or mines against a private/unknown pool.9 We consider that
a miner is using a proxy if we record mining activity for the
corresponding wallet in a known pool (see §III-D).
D. Collecting Mining Activity
One of the main challenges when measuring the impact
of the malicious crypto-mining campaigns is the difficulty to
accurately estimate the profits. In the case of browser-based
cryptojacking, recent works use estimations of the number
of visitors per hour for similar websites and the average
hashrate of a single visitor (victim) [9], [8], [28]. This is
highly inaccurate as evidenced by the variances reported by
concurrent related works (see §VII). In the case of crypto-
mining malware, the actual wallet which the mining reward
is paid to can be extracted. We leverage public information
obtained from mining pools (which include total reward paid
to wallets) to get a more approximate estimation of the profits.
For all the extracted wallets, we queried the most prevalent
mining pools to collect activity associated with these wallets.
While the amount of information offered by each pool varies,
it always contains the timestamp of the last share, the current
(last) hashrate and the total amount of currency paid to the
wallet. Additionally, some pools also provide the historic
hashrate of the wallet and the list of payments done to the
wallet (including timestamp and amount). While the total paid
is always available, some pools only provide payment data
for the last period (e.g. a week or month). Since we are
interested on studying how the payments evolve across time,
we use public APIs to collect this information periodically for
a period of 10 months (July’18-April’19). As a single wallet
can use more than one mining pool, we queried all the wallets
against all the pools. Then, to estimate profits, we aggregate
all the payments sent by the pools to the wallets. In general,
we report payments using XMR. To ease readability we also
report the equivalent in US dollars (USD). However, we note
that we do not have information about when the criminals
have cashed-out their earnings (if ever). Thus, it is hard to
extract an exact figure in USD (and other currencies) due
to the fluctuations on the value of Monero. To approximate
this value, we dynamically extract the exchange rate between
XMR and USD of the date when the payments were made, if
available. We use the average exchange rate of 54 USD/XMR
in cases where historical payments are unavailable.
E. Campaign Analysis
Two major limitations in related works are: i) the simplicity
in which they analyze related mining campaigns, and ii) the
inability to study anonymous cryptocurrencies such as Monero
(as discussed in §XII). Thus, in this work, we aggregate
samples into campaigns following a novel methodology that
leverages various characterizing features observed in the wild.
We emphasize that the methodology we use to aggregate
samples into campaigns is novel. We also note that our
methodology admits a wide range of features.
9While the use of private pools is encouraged in certain underground
communities, we have observed few samples using private pools.
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Spreading Infrastructure. We distinguish two types of infras-
tructure used to spread the malware: one that can be owned
and another one that belongs to a third-party and can be rented
(e.g., botnets that are monetized as PPI services and that are
used for mining). When available, we link samples to known
botnets by querying OSINT information with IoCs extracted
from the samples. We refrain from using these botnets to
aggregate samples as we detail later. However, we use them to
enrich the information of the campaigns in a post-aggregation
phase. This way, we can draw conclusions about the number
of campaigns using known third-party infrastructure. However,
since we rely on public intelligence feeds, a limitation of
this approach is that samples using unknown third-party in-
frastructure (e.g., offered in underground markets) might be
aggregated together in a single campaign. In these cases, we
can guarantee that the campaign runs on top of the same
infrastructure. This is relevant to law enforcement agencies
when devising take-downs strategies. Thus, our analysis con-
siders campaigns that are either from the same actor or a
group of actors that use the same infrastructure, independently
from the monetizing approach used by the operators of the
infrastructure that spreads the samples. Analyzing whether
profits from a campaign are given to a single actor or a group
of actors is out of the scope of this paper.
Grouping Features. We rely on the following features to
group samples into campaigns:
Same identifier: In order to get rewards from the mining pools,
workers must mine using a unique identifier, which in most
cases corresponds with the wallet address to which payments
are made. In other cases, these are e-mails or other identifiers,
like user-generated names. If two samples contain the same
identifier, it means that they are accumulating earnings in the
same wallet and thus they are grouped together. Some mining
tools contain donation wallets to reward the developer, which
is done by mining for a certain time (typically 2-5%) using the
donation wallet. While this is configurable and can be turned
off, we have observed a few samples doing donations. We note
that the CPU cycles donated are also hijacked from the victim
and therefore inflict harm to her. However we are primarily
interested in measuring the earnings of the miscreants, and
thus donation addresses are excluded from the aggregation.
For this reason, we create a white-list by manually extracting
donation wallets from known mining software repositories.
We also enrich our white-list using Google searches (e.g.,
looking for “Monero” and “donation”) and manually analysing
the results. We have white-listed 14 donation wallets directly
obtained from the developers’ sites. Due to limitations in
the manual extraction process, we could be missing dona-
tion wallets. This can result in the over-aggregation of two
independent campaigns as discussed in §VI. Non–white-listed
donation wallets display a characterizing pattern: the same
wallet (the donation wallet) appears together with different
wallets (from the miscreants) in multiple samples across our
dataset. However, we do not observe this pattern after white-
listing all donation wallets we account for. This suggest that
we have effectively white-listed all donation wallets.
Ancestors: In many cases, the same sample is used to down-
load additional malware. This is the case of droppers, which
adapt based on information gathered from the infected host,
e.g.: operating system or processor capabilities. Accordingly,
if a sample is parent of two samples with different wallets,
these are grouped together. Ancestors and other dropped
files that are not directly intended for mining are considered
auxiliary binaries and we refer to them as ancillaries.
This includes samples that do not have a wallet.
Hosting servers: We use metadata from the samples to extract
the URL from where the malware was downloaded. A com-
mon approach is to host the malware (or even stock mining
software) in public cloud storage sites such as Amazon Web
Services (AWS), Dropbox or Google Drive (see §IV-B). Thus,
we aggregate two samples if either they are downloaded from
the same IP address which does not resolve to a domain from
a public repository, or if they are downloaded from exactly the
same URL, e.g: hxxp://suicide.mouzze.had.su/gpu/amd1.exe.
We also include the parameters to avoid those cases where
a parameter is used to uniquely identify the resource being
hosted, e.g.hxxp://file8desktop.com/download/get56?p=19363.
This approach has as limitation that we are not aggregating
resources where a URL contains ephemeral information (e.g.,
timestamps or click-IDs), even when they point to the same
resource in the server. However, this limitation is partially
overcome due to other sources for aggregation.
Known mining campaigns: As mentioned, we collect IoCs
(e.g., domains or wallets) from mining operations reported
publicly. We look at IoCs that are known to belong to a
given mining operation, and look for matches against samples
in our dataset. We group two samples if they belong to the
same operation. In our analysis, we have collected IoC for the
following mining operations: Photominer [29], Adylkuzz [18],
Smominru [17], Xbooster [30], Jenkins [31] and Rocke [32].
However, our methodology is designed to easily include data
collected from new operations.
Domain aliases (CNAMEs): During our investigation, we
observed many samples using domain aliases (i.e., CNAMEs)
that resolve to known mining pools. In these cases, miscreants
create one or various subdomains for a domain under their
control, and set these subdomains to be aliases of known
mining pools. Since the resolution is done for the CNAME
rather than for the mining pool, they thwart defenses black-
listing mining pools (see §VI for a discussion on anti-analysis
techniques). To address this evasion method, we perform DNS
requests for all the domains extracted from our samples, and
look for responses pointing to known mining pools from
a CNAME. Since CNAMEs might have changed, we also
query a DNS history-resolution service provided by AlienVault
(https://www.threatcrowd.org) Accordingly, we aggregate sam-
ples using the same domain alias.
Mining proxies: Mining using a large number of machines
(i.e., more than 100) with the same wallet raises suspicion of
botnet usage, and mining pool operators might opt to ban the
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miner. To prevent this situation, offenders use mining proxies
that gather all the shares from the different bots and forward
the aggregated to the pool. Thus, pool operators only receive
responses from a single machine, the proxy. As described
in §III-C, we identify various samples using proxies. We
aggregate together samples that use the same proxy.
Aggregation. To measure the number of related campaigns
and how they are structured, we build a graph where nodes are
elements of a given resource (e.g., malware samples, proxies,
or wallets) and the edges are determined by the relationships
mentioned above. We consider each connected component of
the graph as a single campaign, where the internal nodes of
the graph represent the crypto-mining malware together with
the infrastructure used by the campaign.
Enrichment. After the aggregation, we enrich each campaign
with samples related to known Pay Per Install (PPI) services,
and mining tools. We emphasize that these features are only
informative and they are not used to aggregate campaigns. We
next explain the rationale behind this.
Botnets and PPI: A common approach to spread malware is
through PPI services, where customers pay a fee to botnet
operators in order to spread their malware [33]. Due to
commodization of cybercrime services, purchasing a botnet
to spread malware is simple and open to anyone with few
technical skills, e.g.: by leveraging underground markets [34].
During our analysis, we have observed samples belonging to
various botnets that are commonly used as PPI services, such
as Virut or Nitol. Since these are known third-party infras-
tructures, two samples using these services are not necessarily
related to each other and thus are not aggregated together.
Stock Mining Software: During our exploratory analysis, we
have observed that many campaigns use stock mining soft-
ware. This is, the hash of a file dropped by the malware
matches with one of the hashes in our collection of mining
tools. Actually, we have observed that some crypto-mining
malware fetch this executable directly from the official Git-
Hub repository. However, we have also observed that some
miscreants fork these projects and make minor modifications
to the mining tool, e.g. to remove donation capabilities.
We use Fuzzy Hashing (FH) to pick up on the aforemen-
tioned modifications and to relate these samples with known
mining tools. FH is a similarity preserving hash function that
allows to compare binary files. Specifically, FH computes
a fingerprint of each binary in such a way that any two
binaries that are almost identical map to a “similar” hash
value. Fuzzy hashing has been shown to be an effective
way of comparing malware [35]. In our pipeline, we use
context triggered piecewise hashing [36] and compute the
distance between the FH of all samples in a campaign and
the FH of all known mining tools. We choose a conservative
distance threshold of 0.1 as it performs well when comparing
malware [35]. Thus, samples with a distance lower than 0.1
are considered as stock mining tools.
Name Description
SHA256 Hash value of the sample
POOL Normalized name of the mining pool
URLPOOL URL to which the sample mines
USER Identifier used to mine in the pool
PASS Password used to authenticate in the pool
NTHREADS Number of CPU threads used for mining
AGENT User agent used for mining
DSTIP IP to which the sample mines
DSTPORT Port used for mining
DNSRR DNS resolutions
SOURCE Data feeds from which the data was obtained
FS Date when the sample was first seen
ITW URL URLs hosting or contacted by the sample
PACKER If any, associated packer used for obfuscation
POSITIVES Number of positive detections by antivirus*
TYPE Either Miner or Ancilliary
TABLE I: Data extracted for each sample. *Note that the
number of AV detecting this malware might increase over
time. Thus, the released dataset contain number of positives
by April’19.
Name Description
POOL Mining pool
USER Wallet Identifier
HASHES Number of hashes shared
HASHRATE Last hash rate
LAST SHARE Date of the last hash
BALANCE Total balance (not paid)
TOTAL PAID Total XMR paid
NUM PAYMENTS Number of payments
DATE QUERY Date of last query
USD Estimated total paid value in USD
TABLE II: Data extracted for each wallet. In addition to this,
for each wallet we also account for the payments and the
timestamps extracted from all transparent pools. Furthermore,
for the minexmr pool, we account for the historical hash rate
of the wallets.
F. Summary of data extracted
Table I summarize the data extracted from each sample.
Table II summarize the data extracted for each XMR wallet
and each mining pool.
IV. THE BINARY-BASED MINING THREAT
In this section, we present the analysis of our measurement.
We first present our dataset (§IV-A), which contains malware
seen for over a decade. Next, we perform a longitudinal
analysis through the lens of our dataset (§IV-B). Then, we
characterize the type of mining pools and currencies we have
seen (§IV-C) and study the earnings of the campaigns in the
most prevalent cypto-currency, i.e.: Monero (§IV-D).
A. Dataset
Our study results from the collection of 4.5 million malware
samples from the range of sources described in §III-A. We then
apply sanity checks to tailor our analysis to crypto-mining
malware only, resulting in a total of: (i) 1,017,110 miner
binaries, and (ii) 212,923 ancillary binaries.
The samples in (i) are samples where we have observed
mining capabilities together with an associated wallet and a
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Category Type #Samples
Summary
ALL EXECUTABLES 1,230,033
Miner Binaries 1,017,110
Ancillary Binaries 212,923
Sources
Virus Total 956,252
Palo Alto Networks 628,915
Hybrid Analysis 857
Virus Share 519
Resources
Sandbox Analysis 1,143,384
Network Analysis 258,564
Binary Analysis 10,204
TABLE III: Our dataset of miners and ancillaries, with the
collection sources and the number of resources.
pool address. The samples in (ii) are samples used by the
miners to run the mining operation (e.g., bot clients or loaders).
In total, our study leverages over 1.2 million crypto-mining
malware samples. Table III shows a summary of our dataset,
together with the breakdown of data sources and the type
of resources we resort from.10 Our largest source of miners
is Virus Total and the smallest is Virus Share. As for the
resources, we collect the largest number of wallets and pools
through dynamic analysis (sandbox and network analysis). The
data collection dates to March 2007 to capture the structure of
the third party infrastructure from their early stages. However,
malicious mining activity starts getting traction in 2011.
B. Longitudinal Analysis
We extract 16,050 different crypto-mining identifiers from a
total of 103,894 samples. As mentioned, these mostly include
addresses of wallets from various cryptocurrencies, but we also
find emails and other identifiers used to authenticate the miner
in the pool to later pay them the corresponding reward. In
the case of wallets, we use regular expressions to detect the
associated currency. Regarding the emails, we observe that
the majority (97%) are used as identifiers of one of the most
popular mining pools, i.e.: minergate.11
Overall, we aggregate samples into 11,387 different cam-
paigns. Figure 4 depicts the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) for the number of samples, and identifiers in all the
campaigns. It also shows an overview of the earnings made in
pools that provide public statistics for wallets. Leftmost side
of Table IV shows the breakdown of the number of campaigns
per type of identifier (i.e., wallets and other identifiers).
Recall that wallet addresses represent the public key of an
electronic wallet in a given cryptocurrency. Thus, we show
the breakdown for the different cryptocurrencies for which
we have wallets. Note that two or more identifiers can be
used in the same campaign, for example due to a change of
a previous wallet address after being banned [17]. Monero is
the cryptocurrency most frequently used, followed by Bitcoin.
There are at least 18 campaigns using two or more currencies.
While most of the campaigns are composed by one or few
wallets (see Figure 4), we observe campaigns having up to
304 different identifiers.
10See Appendix C for details about other sources crawled.
11For a detailed analysis, see Table XV from Appendix D.
# campaigns with wallet addresses for: # samples seen in:
Monero 2,449
Bitcoin 1,535
zCash 178
Electroneum 150
Ethereum 132
Aeon 57
Sumokoin 18
Intensecoin 8
Turtlecoin 3
Bytecoin 1
Year BTC XMR
2012 9 1
2013 23 3
2014 223 281
2015 115 1.6K
Mixed 17
Sub-total 4,548
2016 461 8.7K
2017 3.8K 31K
With other identifiers: 2018 1.3K 6.2K
Email 5,008
Unknown 2,195
2019 1* 49*
∼19? 1.7K 14K
TOTAL 11,751 ALL 7.6K 62K
TABLE IV: Leftmost side of the table: number of campaigns
per currency, amount of e-mails and unknown identifiers (i.e.,
not associated with a known currency). Rightmost: number of
samples (*partial data) seen in a given year for Bitcoin (BTC)
and Monero (XMR).
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Fig. 4: Cumulative distribution number of samples, wallets and
earnings observed per campaign.
Out of all the samples with wallets, we rely on the first seen
value (obtained from the metadata of the samples provided by
Virus Total) to analyse the evolution of number of samples
mining Bitcoin and Monero. Rightmost side of Table IV shows
the number of samples with wallets by year for the most
prevalent cryptocurrencies, i.e.: Monero (XMR) and Bitcoin
(BTC). Overall, the dataset contains 7.6K BTC and 62K XMR
malware samples.12 Judging by the number of samples and
the distribution across time, we can confirm the decreasing
interest in Bitcoin in favour of Monero. Moreover, we have
queried available Bitcoin pools with the BTC addresses, and
observed negligible earnings (i.e., less than 5K USD). Note
that the data collection ended in early 2019 and thus data
from this year is partial. Also, due to constraints in the Virus
Total rate limit we could not retrieve the first seen entry for
some of the most recently discovered samples. However, we
attribute this samples to 2019 (denoted as ∼19? in Table IV).
As it can be observed, there are 4 samples that were seen in
2012 and in 2013 and that have later been mining Monero,
which was released in 2014. This is due to malware reuse,
i.e., malware samples that dynamically update their code
and execute components downloaded at a later stage (after
12These are samples with embedded wallets and does not include ancillar-
ies.
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installation time), namely droppers. For the curious reader,
and to foster malware analysis, Table V show data related to
these 4 samples, including hash value and associated wallets.
Note that two samples are linked to the same XMR wallet.
MD5 Year XMR wallet
8b15eb749457b601495c87f465c525f4 2012 46G5yoqAPP...
2e2ca457803bc6203ddbb5ee4e8855e6 2013 46G5yoqAPP...
24f08ad6e827f7029141df20f799d6a4 2013 4BrL51JCc9...
80c30914f32b732868370de6a745bab3 2013 4JUdGzvrMF...
TABLE V: Malware samples observed in the wild before 2014
that have later been updated to mine Monero.
Table VI shows an excerpt of the most popular URL
domains hosting crypto-miners.13 We observe that GitHub is
the chosen site used to host the crypto-mining malware. This
is because GitHub hosts most of the mining tools, which
are directly downloaded — for malicious purposes — by
droppers as discussed before. Additionally, GitHub is also used
to host modified versions of the miners (e.g., by removing
the donation capabilities or adding further capabilities). It
is also used to host ancillary malicious tools [37]. We also
observe that there are other public repositories and file sharing
sites such as Bitbucket or 4sync, and web hosting sites such
as Amazon (AWS), Google, or Dropbox. One can also find
mining malware hosted through torrent sites (b-tor.ru), enter-
tainment sites (telekomtv-internet.ro), or hosted as attachments
in the Discord app, a voice and text chat (cdn.discordapp.com).
There are also URL-shortener sites (goo.gl). This altogether
shows that crypto-miners largely rely on publicly available
third-party servers. The use of these services provides an
economical incentive when compared to other approaches that
use dedicated infrastructure such as bullet-proof servers — that
are more resilient against take-downs.
Our longitudinal analysis confirms previous reports positioning
Monero as the preferred currency used by miscreants for
crypto-mining malware [16]. Thus, in the rest of the paper
we focus our attention on campaigns using Monero.
Domains #Samples #URLs
github.com 163 388
*.amazonaws.com 85 396
www.weebly.com 80 96
*.google.com 38 74
hrtests.ru 37 1
cdn.discordapp.com 34 55
a.cuntflaps.me 32 48
file-5.ru 30 52
TOTAL #: 2755(# domains) 3420 6949
TABLE VI: Excerpt of domains hosting known mining mal-
ware, number of samples hosted under each domain and
number of URLs hosting those samples.
C. Mining Pools
There are two possible strategies for mining: joining a
pool or mining alone (which we call solo-mining). Using
13For a complete list ordered by prevalence, see Table XIII in Appendix D.
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Fig. 5: Number of different mining pools used by the cam-
paigns grouped by earnings.
mining pools instead of “solo-mining strategies” has several
advantages: it increases the chances of receiving payments
for mining and reduces the need for specialized mining
equipment. Selecting a mining pool is not straightforward
because it depends on many dynamic factors such as the
current hashrate of the pool, or the complexity required for
mining. Pools with a high number of workers are more likely
to mine a block faster, but the reward received is lower. To
understand the popularity of the different mining pools among
criminals, we look at the number of wallets and the amount
of XMR mined over the most consolidated pools (according
to various benchmarks such as http://moneropools.com, or
https://minexmr.com/pools.html) that provide public informa-
tion about the wallets. Table VII provides a list of these
pools ranked by popularity among criminals (in terms of
earnings). We show that the most popular pools are crypto-
pool and dwarfpool, with more than 429K and 168K XMR
mined respectively. When looking at the number of wallets
observed, the most common pool used is minexmr, with (at
least) 608 wallets. An interesting pool not included in our
analysis is minergate. We have found 4,980 emails mining
at this pool in our dataset. Since minergate does not provide
public information about the rewards paid to the miners, we
are unable to estimate profits from this pool.
Our analysis show that 49.3% of the campaigns use or have
used more than one pool. Figure 5 shows the number of pools
used by different campaigns grouped by the amount of Monero
mined. As it can be observed, the 97% of the campaigns with
largest earnings (i.e., over 1K XMR) have used more than
one pool. However, seven campaigns with earnings over 10K
are using just one pool. Out of these, six use dwarfpool and
one uses crypto-pool. This suggests that mining in different
pools depends on different strategies, probably driven by the
revenues from each pool and their banning policies.
D. Monero-based Campaigns
As shown in Table IV, we find 2,360 campaigns mining
Monero. Out of those, we are able to get payments to 2,145
campaigns through querying the various mining pools.
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Pool XMR Mined #Wallets USD
crypto-pool 429,393 487 47,261,821
dwarfpool 168,796 461 1,088,516
minexmr 74,396 608 5,320,397
poolto 29,044 38 35,815
prohash 12,833 54 275,471
nanopool 5,205 375 858,949
monerohash 4,046 217 477,557
ppxxmr 3,860 185 518,487
supportxmr 3,217 241 443,087
Others (8) 2,797 314 325,034
TABLE VII: Overview of the popularity of the different min-
ing pools ranked by the amount of XMR mined by malware.
Campaign #S #W Period XMR $
C#627 66 7 06/16 to active* 163,756 20 M
C#3027 20 2 10/16 to 04/18 59,620 8 M
C#268 134 4 01/15 to 02/19 42,069 323 K
C#102 59 1 09/14 to 04/18 32,886 53 K
C#693 106 2 08/14 to 02/19 27,985 95 K
C#1290 91 14 06/16 to active* 27,086 1 M
C#10465 6 1 09/16 to 04/18 23,300 2 M
C#3311 9 1 06/16 to 05/18 22,520 5 M
C#2642 46 1 09/14 to 04/18 21,389 42 K
C#2202 25 1 09/14 to 04/18 20,694 38 K
TOP-10 562 34 2014/08/30 - * 441,305 38 M
ALL-2235 64 K 2532 2014/07/18 - * 740,927 58 M
TABLE VIII: Top 10 campaigns ranked by amount of XMR
mined. C=Campaign #S=Num. of samples, #W=Num. of wal-
lets, and active* on April 2019. Recall that the exchange
rate to USD is computed dynamically based on when the
payments were made.
We summarize the results of our aggregation in Table VIII
and show some demographics for the top 10 campaigns. Note
the difference between USD and XMR in some campaigns.
As explained before, this is due to fluctuations of the XMR
value and depends on when payments were made. A note of
precaution when looking at the USD figures as we are unaware
of when criminals cash-out their moneros. Thus, we prefer to
report our findings in primarily in XMR. Overall, we estimate
that there are at least 2,235 campaigns that have accumulated
about 741K XMR (58M USD). Some of them are still active.
Interestingly, just a single campaign (C#627) has mined more
than 163K XMR (20M USD), which accounts for about 22%
of the total estimated. This campaign is still active at the time
of writing and it is later studied in §V-A. We observe that
only the top 10 campaigns mine more than the remaining 2,225
ones. Overall, we observe that 99% of the campaigns earn less
than 100 XMR (see Figure 4). We also observe that while
majority of the campaigns earn very little, there are a few
campaigns overly profitable. This indicates that the core of this
illicit business is monopolized by a small number of wealthy
actors.
There are campaigns with a large number of samples, with
up to 12K in the case of C#4 (see further details in our
repository).14 However, some of the most profitable campaigns
have few samples (e.g., C#10465 or C#3311). This means that
14https://github.com/gsuareztangil/cryptomining-malware
Tool #I (#S) #V #C
xmrig 415 (299) 59 262
claymore 861 (853) 14 98
niceHash 108 (21) 11 67
learnMiner 2 (2) 2 2
ccminer 1 (1) 1 1
TABLE IX: The most popular mining tools used. I=Instances,
S=Samples, V=Versions, C=Campaigns
either the samples in those campaigns have infected a large
number of victims, or that other samples from the campaign
are not detected by any AV. In either case, it suggests that
there are some miscreants that are proficient in remaining
undetected. In the next section we analyze the infrastructure
and stealth techniques used by the different campaigns, and
how this affects their efficiency.
While most of profitable campaigns started in 2016 or
earlier, we observe recent campaigns with large earnings. In
particular, 21 campaigns that started in 2018 have mined more
than 100 XMR, 12 of which are active at the time of writing
(April 2019).
E. Infrastructure
We next analyze the third-party infrastructure used in the
different Monero campaigns.
Mining software. Table IX shows an overview of the stock
mining tools used by the different campaigns. We show that
xmrig, claymore and niceHash are the most popular
tools we account for. With the current distance threshold in
our Fuzzy Hashing algorithm, we found no evidence pointing
to the use of other less popular tools such as: cast-xmr,
jceMiner, srbMiner, or yam. When using a higher thresh-
old, we found one campaign using xmr-stak. Overall, the
top most popular frameworks account for approximately 18%
of the Monero campaigns. Note that obfuscated versions of
these tools are sold in underground marketplaces. Thus, these
numbers should be viewed as a lower approximation.
Domain aliases for mining pools. A common mitigation
strategy often suggested in commercial reports [4] is to
block known mining pools, using blacklists. Criminals create
CNAME domain aliases to evade this mitigation. In our
analysis, we observe 215 different CNAMEs. Most of these
are aliases of minexmr (176), crypto-pool (21) and dwarfpool
(14). Interestingly, there are two aliases (x.alibuf.com and
xmrf.fjhan.club) which have been eventually used to hide two
different pools each. This suggests again dynamic changes
in the mining strategy used by criminals to maximize their
revenue. We note that the former alias is actually part of the
most profitable campaign (C#627), which is detailed in §V-A.
Pay-Per-Install services. In order to spread malware, crimi-
nals use commodity botnets offered as PPI services in under-
ground markets [33], [34]. We find samples from 3 different
botnets offering PPI services. In particular, we observe 511
samples associated with the Virut botnet (in 44 different cam-
paigns), 46 from Ramnit (in 10 campaigns) and 27 from Nitol
(in 3 campaigns). Also, in one of the biggest campaigns (C#8),
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UPX 328,493
NSIS 17,464
maxorder 5,988
SFX 3,928
INNO 2,423
eval 2,032
docwrite 1,490
ARJ 858
CAB 721
Enigma 710
Others 4,019
Not packed 862,712
TABLE X: Packers used for binary obfuscation.
known as Photominer [29], we find 346 samples (3.01%) of
the samples belonging to this campaign) using Virut to deploy
the mining operation. Recall that campaigns are automatically
extracted. Observing campaigns from botnets that are know
to the community shows that our heuristics provide a reliable
aggregation. Yet, our framework steps up finding novel cam-
paigns as shown in §V.
Obfuscation. A common practice when spreading malware is
to obfuscate the binary to avoid detection. Criminals typically
use existing tools, such as well-known packers (e.g., UPX)
or crypters. Packers can be fingerprinted more easily than
crypters, but crypters — which are usually purchased in
underground markets — increase the cost of the operation.
By leveraging the F-Prot unpacker [38], we extract packer
information associated with each sample (when applicable).
This tool also identifies compression algorithms, which are
not considered obfuscation. Then, we look at the entropy to
detect whether some other unknown obfuscation is applied in
samples where no packer or compression algorithm is detected.
In our implementation, we choose a conservative threshold
of 7.5 (where 8 means total randomness) to decide when a
sample is obfuscated, which is more restrictive than values
tested in previous works [39], [40]. We found that around 30%
of the samples are obfuscated. We consider that a campaign
uses obfuscation if a large proportion of their samples (i.e.,
80%) are obfuscated. While this is the ratio in the overall
dataset, we found that only 4.16% of Monero campaigns use
obfuscation. Table X summarizes the number of samples using
obfuscation together with the tool used to obfuscate it. UPX
is by far the most common tool used. Interestingly, we have
seen many binaries created using AutoIt (a Windows-based
scripting language) which by default packs the script into
an PE file using UPX. In §VI we discuss the limitations of
analyzing obfuscated binaries.
Analysis. Table XI shows the third-party infrastructure, stealth
techniques and period of activities for the different Monero
campaigns (both divided according to their profits, and over-
all). While only 1.1% of the campaigns use domain aliases, a
higher proportion is found in most profitable campaigns (9.4%
of those mining between 1K and 10K XMR, and 26.7% of
those mining more than 10K XMR). A similar situation hap-
pens with proxies and PPI services, which are more common
in successful campaigns (i.e., with larger earnings).
Most profitable campaigns have longer period of activity
(46.7% have been active since 2014). However, we also
observe a high portion of campaigns (26.7%) operating only
XMR Mined < 100 [100-1k) [1k-10k) >10k ALL
#Campaigns 2,013 154 53 15 2,235
THIRD PARTY INFRASTRUCTURE
PPI 1.3% 3.2% 9.4% 13.3% 1.7%
Mining SW 8.6% 14.9% 30.2% 13.3% 9.6%
Both 0.4% 1.3% 7.5% 0.0% 0.7%
STEALTH TECHNIQUES
Obfuscation 4.0% 5.2% 3.8% 0.0% 4.0%
CNAMEs 0.3% 5.2% 9.4% 26.7% 1.1%
Proxies 2.6% 6.5% 3.8% 20.0% 3.0%
PERIOD OF ACTIVITY
+ Apr-18 24.6% 57.8% 49.1% 33.3% 27.6%
+ Oct-18 9.1% 27.3% 18.9% 33.3% 10.7%
+ Mar-19 2.7% 13.0% 5.7% 13.3% 3.5%
Start: 2014 0.2% 4.5% 11.3% 46.7% 0.2%
Start: 2015 0.2% 1.9% 3.8% 13.3% 0.2%
Start: 2016 5.5% 26.0% 41.5% 40.0% 5.0%
Start: 2017 37.3% 51.3% 41.5% 0.0% 33.6%
Start: 2018 51.7% 13.0% 1.9% 0.0% 46.6%
Start: 2019 0.5% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
Years: 0 69.6% 11.0% 1.9% 0.0% 62.7%
Years: 1 28.0% 57.8% 41.5% 6.7% 25.2%
Years: 2 2.2% 24.7% 39.6% 20.0% 2.0%
Years: 3 0.2% 3.2% 7.5% 20.0% 0.2%
Years: 4 0.0% 3.2% 9.4% 53.3% 0.0%
TABLE XI: Summary of infrastructure, techniques and period
of activity for the different campaigns targeting Moneros
grouped by profit.
for 1 or 2 years and still having large profits. We also note
the percentage of campaigns active before and after changes
in the PoW (Proofs-of-Work): on 06/04/2018, 18/10/2018
and 09/03/2019. These changes require the update of mining
software. This means that either botnet operators have to
update their bots, or customers of PPI services must buy new
installs. We show that most of the campaigns stopped due to
PoW updates: around 72.4% in April 2018, 89.3% in October
2018 and 96.5% in March 2019.15 This means that changes in
the PoW algorithm might be an effective (though unwitting)
countermeasure, as discussed in §VI.
F. Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways of our analysis include:
1) We observe that it is no longer profitable to mine Bitcoin,
and current criminal efforts focus on mining ASIC-resistant
currencies. We also show that there are a small number of
actors that monopolize the crypto-mining malware ecosys-
tem. Recent works found similar conclusions in web-based
cryptojacking [8], [9] and crypto-mining malware targeting
Bitcoin [15] (although this study was from 2014, when mining
Bitcoin using desktop computers was profitable).
2) We note that some successful mining campaigns are very
complex in terms of the size and infrastructure supporting
the campaign. Our data shows that about 11% of these are
supported by other underground economies such as third-party
Pay-Per-Install botnets. On the contrary, we also observe very
profitable mining campaigns that do not appear to use a large
supporting infrastructure. Instead, they are effective campaigns
15Given that our data is from April 2019, some of these campaigns might
not be defunct, since it might take some time to update the miners.
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(due to their long lifetime) with obfuscation and novel evasion
techniques, e.g.: using CNAMEs to bypass blacklist-based
detection.
3) We estimate that the malicious ecosystem has currently
mined at least 4.37% of the total Monero in circulation
(approximately 58M USD). These numbers must be added to
estimations made using web-browser cryptojacking in paralell
work.
4) It is common to see campaigns mining in various pools.
We observe that the most popular mining pools are crypto-
pool, dwarfpool and minexmr. We show that a large number of
samples mine to minergate, an opaque mining pool for which
there is no publicly-available information about the rewards
received.
5) When looking at the activity period, we find long-lasting
campaigns — some of which are active at the time of writing.
In particular, we can see multi-million campaigns operating
for a continuous period of more than four years (see Top-
10 in Table VIII). This shows that AVs have not addressed
this threat appropriately. We argue that crypto-mining malware
has not been given enough attention by the industry and the
research community and novel countermeasures are required
as discussed in §VI.
V. CASE STUDIES
We next present two case studies related to high-profit
campaigns that have not been previously reported. Fig. 6
presents an overview of how the campaigns are structured. In
the graphs, nodes in blue represent wallets and nodes in light-
green represent malware miners. Thus, various light-green
nodes connected to a blue node represent a group of samples
using the same wallet. Nodes in gray and pink represent the
infrastructure of the campaign, with gray nodes portraying
contacted domain servers and the pink ones the malware hosts.
Finally, ancillary malware are depicted in red and orange. The
edges represent the connections described in §III-E.
A. The Freebuf Campaign
The most profitable Monero campaign (C#627 in Ta-
ble VIII) has mined more than 163K XMR in 3 years using
7 wallets. We have named it ‘Freebuf’ because the main
grouping feature is the domain xt.freebuf.info, which is an alias
(CNAME) of the minexmr pool.
Structure. Figure 6 shows how the campaign is structured. We
observe that the aggregation is dominated by three grouping
features: (i) same identifier, (ii) ancestors, and (iii) domain
aliases (CNAMEs). Interestingly, the graph of this campaign
reveals groups of samples with wallets that reach out to one
another through paths traversing these three grouping features.
In other words, the three grouping features are the key to
map the structure of the campaign. In particular, there are two
domains linked through a common wallet: x.alibuf.com and
xmr.honker.info, which in turn are connected to xt.freebuf.info.
Note that both have been aliases of minexmr, and x.alibuf.com
has also been an alias of crypto-pool. We can observe that
the backbone of the graph is established through connections
of samples linked to CNAMEs. From there, there are other
clusters that are linked via same identifier, and to those, there
are some samples which are connected by common ancestors.
Payments. By analyzing the different payments received
through time, we observe that before the update of the PoW
in April 2018, this campaign was mining in various pools
simultaneously. However, after the update all mining efforts
were put into minexmr. In September 2018 we reported the
wallets to the largest pools, resulting in two wallets being
banned in October 2018. Upon request, one pool operator
kindly provided us with statistics regarding the number of
different IPs behind the wallets. The two banned wallets
connected from 5,352 and 8,099 different IPs and had mined
362.6 and 1,283.7 XMR respectively. As a consequence of
banning, we observe that the campaign operator decided
to move their mining efforts to another pool (ppxmr) —
which indeed was used before the update on April 2018. We
visualize these payments in Figures 7 and 8 from Appendix E.
We have seen that as a result of this intervention, together
with the change in the PoW algorithm in October 2018, the
payments received by the wallets associated to this campaign
have been considerably reduced.
B. The USA-138 Campaign
We have also named this campaign following the name
of the CNAME that characterizes this campaign: xmr.usa-
138.com. Overall, this campaign has mined (at least) 7,242
XMR and it has 137 samples and 4 wallets. None of the
samples from the campaign are known mining software and
the campaign does not use proxies. Recall that this campaign
is still active at the time of writing in December 2018. Out of
all the samples, 43 are obfuscated with UPX.
Structure. Figure 6b shows how this campaign is structured.
We see that there are two clusters of samples connected
through a common host (221.9.251.236). This host, which
operates in China, is still online at the time of writing and it
is still hosting the malware used to run the criminal operation.
One of the wallets (on the left-most side of the graph) is an
Electroneum (ETN) wallet (another cryptocurrency based on
the CryptoNote algorithm). The remaining wallets are Monero.
We observe a domain, 4i7i.com, which is used both as a
domain alias (pool.4i7i.com) for crypto-pool, and as a malware
host (e.g., hxxp://4i7i.com/11.exe). We note that the samples
using the Electroneum wallet connect to a pool in etn.4i7i.com.
This domain is probably the domain alias of a Electroneum
pool, but we are unable to find passive DNS data.
Payments. As mentioned, the campaign has mined 6,709
XMR (around 651K USD). When looking at the amount
of earnings made with the Electroneum wallet, we observe
earnings of 314,18 ETN. The equivalent of this is currently
less than 5 USD. While this might seem little at the moment, it
might be worth much more in the future. Regarding Monero,
this campaign mainly relies on minexmr and crypto-pool.
As depicted in Figure 6c, the most active wallet (named as
49e9B8H...) operated mainly with minexmr after the April
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(a) The Freebuf campaign (C#627). 	
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http://4i7i.com/11.exe
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(b) The USA-138 campaign.
(c) Payments per wallet for USA-138.
Fig. 6: Overview of the analysis of our case studies. For Fig. 6c, the dashed red lines correspond to the two changes in the
Monero PoW algorithm. Dashed blue lines show the day when the wallets were banned in minexmr.
2018 update. Once again, we reported the wallets to the pools
and soon after we found a similar behavior as with the Freebuf
campaign: after the wallet was banned in minexmr the malware
operators moved to crypto-pool again. Different to Freebuf,
this campaign ‘survived’ the PoW change in October 2018
and is still receiving payments from this pool.
When looking at the number of connections made by the
samples using the wallet 49e9B8H... to the minexmr pool, we
observed over 13K IPs. These samples have been mining after
the update in April’18. This indicates that the campaign uses
a medium-sized botnet which is kept updated.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze existing countermeasures, pre-
senting their main challenges and weaknesses and looking at
potential directions to address this challenge. We also discuss
the limitations of our work.
Reporting illicit wallets. Reporting illicit wallets to the pools,
while being a common — and important — practice [16], is
not an effective countermeasure. First, it is costly and requires
cooperation and coordination from all (or at least the main)
pool operators. Second, criminals have developed mechanisms
to bypass detection (e.g., using mining proxies). During our
study, we have reported the illicit wallets we found to the
largest pools, together with evidence of criminal behavior. We
found two issues. First, there are non-cooperative pools that
chose not to ban wallets found within crypto-mining malware;
and second, those that are cooperative pools tend to err on
the safe side. For example, the pool minexmr, while being
remarkably cooperative, has a policy that only blocks wallets
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with a large number of associated connections. Recall that
there are criminals that leverage on a small set of machines
(i.e., proxies) to hide botnet-related mining activity. Thus, only
banning botnet-related mining activity proves ineffective.
Additionally, we found that many successful campaigns
use several pools at the same time. While this practice has
drawbacks for criminals (mining workers compete with each
other), it also makes their campaigns more resilient to take-
down operations. Criminals respond to such take-downs by
changing the mining pool being used (as we have seen in the
case studies presented in §V) or by creating new wallets and
setting proxies up [17].
Changes in the Proof-of-Work algorithm. ASIC-based min-
ing uses hardware support customized for specific algorithms
to compute the faster PoWs [19]. Frequent changes in the
algorithm are intended to hinder ASIC-based mining, due
to the cost of creating new hardware with each change.
These changes also require updates in the software, which
is straightforward for benign miners. However, in the case of
crypto-mining malware, it requires botnet operators to update
their bots. In turn PPI users have to purchase further installs to
push the updated version of their miners. We have monitored
three changes in the PoW of Monero: April 6th, 2018, October
18th, 2018 and in March 9th, 2019. In each change, about
72%, 89% and 96% of the campaigns ceased their operations.
Due to the cost of updating the mining infrastructure, we
observe a large number of campaigns not providing valid
shares after changes in the mining algorithm (i.e. due to mining
with an outdated algorithm). This does not mean that the
mining has ceased: a non-updated miner does not provide
valid hashes, but it is still mining using infected computers.
Thus, the victim is still being harmed as long as the mining
continues.
Although changes in the algorithms do not dismantle con-
solidated campaigns, they can dissuade new ones. Thus, a
potential countermeasure against crypto-mining malware is to
increment the frequency of such changes, and design these
changes to not only be anti-ASIC, but also anti-botnet.
Security by design and liability. In addition to non-coopera-
tive pools, we have observed that a large number of samples
mine through opaque pools. We position that the community
should work on devising protocols that enforce transparency
to nodes that act as pools. Mining is a process which requires
cooperation from the miners, who get rewards in exchange.
Similarly, a potential solution would be to design protocols
or techniques that reward transparent and cooperative pools.
Likewise, pools could also improve the mechanisms they use
to detect malicious miners, and the actions they take against
them. Additionally, we argue that a legal framework should
be formulated to regulate the pool industry.
Third-party infrastructure. We observe that most mining
campaigns use third-party infrastructure, both illicit and le-
gitimate. The former includes PPI services, malware packers
or private mining pools allowing botnets to mine. The latter
includes cloud hosting services such as Dropbox or AWS, and
stock mining tools such as xmrig or claymore-tool. During our
analysis, we have observed proficient campaigns making use
of both types. Using public OSINT, we have analyzed IoCs
observed in the samples to associate them to known third-party
infrastructure. In particular, we have observed three known PPI
services (i.e. Virut, Nitol and Ramnit) used by campaign opera-
tors to spread their miners across 355K malware variants using
known packers. However, we have learned about third-party
infrastructure (e.g., non-reported botnets, custom malware
obfuscators or bullet-proof hosting servers) being offered in
underground markets. Thus, a limitation of our approach is that
campaigns that use such unknown third-party infrastructure
(i.e., for which there is no OSINT information) can be grouped
together. Detecting such new third-party infrastructure is out of
the scope of this study, since this requires investigating each
campaign separately and applying other type of intelligence
— by further investigating tools exchanged in underground
markets or infiltrating these campaigns. Having said it, we
have argued that having campaigns grouped by unknown third-
party infrastructure, while it hinders our ability to account
for the number of individual actors, it is nonetheless useful
for law enforcement when prioritizing take-downs and for
security practitioners when understanding the magnitude of
the problem and devising novel mitigation strategies.
Quality of the ground-truth. One obvious countermeasure
to this threat is to keep educating users to have updated AVs.
This countermeasure requires AVs — provided the magnitude
of the threat — to have a very comprehensive dataset of
signatures. However, judging by the activity period of some
of the campaigns we have seen that AV vendors have not
been up to this task. This is a known limitation of the Threat
Intelligence industry [24].
Likewise, in our work, we rely on different independent
AV vendors to set our ground-truth. This might introduce two
types of errors that limit our work: False Positives (FP), where
a legitimate sample is erroneously flagged as malware, and
False Negatives (FN), where malware is flagged as legitimate.
Moreover, the boundaries between ‘malicious’ and ‘legitimate’
samples are unclear: a legitimate mining software, when used
maliciously in infected computers (i.e. without user consent)
might be considered malware (and indeed, most AV classify
these tools as malware). We note that establishing an optimal
trade-off between benign and malicious mining is not straight-
forward [9], [8].
We deal with FP by setting up a relatively high number of
positive detections (i.e., 10 AVs).16 However, by doing this we
are also introducing FN. In this paper, we err on minimizing
the number of FP knowing that our findings have to be seen
as an under-approximation of the current threat.
We would like to explore a more greedy trade-off by setting
the number of positive detections to lower values (e.g., 5
AVs). We argue that this should not incur into many FPs
16There is one exception to this: we keep a sample with less than 10 AV
positives when it contains a wallet observed in another sample having 10 or
more AV positives.
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as we have introduced a white-listing of known mining tools
— which are more prone to be misclassified. In addition, we
note that these tools do not contain hard-coded wallets and/or
Stratum connections are not observed when run alone in a
sandbox. Exploring this in detail is precisely the scope of
our future work. Finally, it is worth noting that we assume
that a wallet is illicit when it seen together with a malware.
However, not all the mining might be illicit. For example, the
criminal could start mining from his own PC before/while she
is mining illicitly. This is unlikely, but we would not have
technical means to make this distinction should it were to
happen. While some of the mining could be done licitly, we
however argue that the revenues obtained from this activity
revert on a criminal anyway. Thus, it can be used to fuel other
illicit activities and the figures associated to this wallets are
therefore relevant to our study.
Quality of the aggregation. Our methodology is used to
group samples and wallets into campaigns. We leverage the
data collected mostly for this purpose, but we also collect
additional data to measure the magnitude of the problem.
We use manual verification to evaluate that our heuristics
are coherent. When campaigns relate to know mining botnets
(e.g., Photominer, or Adylkuzz), we verify that the structure
of the campaign matches with what has been reported about
that botnet. When looking at novel campaigns, we verify that
the resulting aggregation matches with the one provided by
our heuristics. This can be seen from the case studies shown
in §V. However, we acknowledge that our heuristics are not
complete and can be subject to errors in the aggregation. This
can lead to both campaigns that are under- or over-aggregated.
In general, we have design our heuristics to be conservative
to avoid over-aggregation. For example, we aggregate based
on the full in-the-wild URL (rather than by domain name)
to avoid aggregating campaigns that use common third-party
infrastructure like Amazon WS or GitHub.
Anti-analysis techniques. A limiting factor of the quality of
the ground-truth is the ability of malware to hinder detection.
On the one hand, malware uses obfuscation to thwart static
analysis. We have seen that this generally comes in the form
of packers and crypters, although advanced adversaries might
be using polymorphic or metamorphic malware.
Like in many of the current countermeasures, we have
partially addressed this in two ways. First, we looked at
the usage of known packers and saw that a small number
of campaigns used them. As not all packing algorithms are
known, and thus not all samples can be unpacked, we have
also looked at the entropy of the binaries.
On the other hand, malware uses evasion techniques to
thwart dynamic analysis. While there are many forms of
evasion we are vulnerable to (e.g., sandbox detection [41]), we
put special efforts to address those targeting the crypto-mining
malware realm in particular. Specifically, we have attempted
to de-anonymize domain aliases that masked connections to
mining pools (c.f., §III-E). However, despite our efforts, our
study inherits the limitations of both static dynamic analysis
and thus can unavoidably miss samples from advanced adver-
saries. A way to cope with other advanced adversaries that
use other forms of evasion, such as anti-emulation techniques,
would be to use bare metal solutions [7].
Mining-tailored solutions. One common strategy when as-
suming adversaries leveraging advanced obfuscation and eva-
sion techniques, is to devise solutions that are tailored to the
type of threat. Since miners have a distinctive CPU usage,
one can rely on this to build an anomaly detection system
for crypto-malware. Related works rely on modeling of the
CPU usage [8] or on instrumenting web browsers to detect
suspicious activity [42], [11]. While these approaches are
effective for web-based cryptojacking, these types of defenses
are not effective with crypto-mining malware for one reason:
the malware controls the infected computer and thus it can
evade any local defenses (e.g., by acting as a rootkit and
tampering with the CPU monitoring module). Other works
propose to monitor the CPU usage of a computer from a
hypervisor to protect Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds [6].
However, this approach focuses on protecting cloud providers,
and it is not applicable to end-users. An alternative is to
offload the usage monitor to an external system and look
at the energy consumption fingerprint. While power-aware
anomaly detection systems have been proposed to detect
smartphone malware in general [43], [44], we are not aware
of a solution tailored to crypto-mining malware for general-
purpose computers. We position that these solutions could
be deployed by electric-companies to end-users with smart-
meters.
VII. RELATED WORK
Illicit mining has been a threat since the emergence of
Bitcoin in 2009. However, it has not been properly addressed
in academia until recently. The first analysis of crypto-mining
malware was published in 2014 by Huang et al. [15]. Au-
thors analyzed botnets and campaigns mining bitcoins. They
found that malicious malware mined at least 4.5K bitcoins
(which was worth around $3.2M in 2014). Since mining
bitcoins using end-user computers is no longer profitable, both
cryptocurrency malware and web-based cryptojacking rely on
cryptocurrencies resistant to ASIC mining, such as Monero or
Bytecoin. Thus, most of the illicit mining focuses on Monero
nowadays [16], [9], [8]. Recent works analyzed web-based
mining, both as an alternative to advertisements to monetize
web content [13], [12] and as cryptojacking, where mining
is done without the consent of users [8], [9], [10]. Konoth
et al. analyzed the Top 1M Alexa sites looking for web-
browser cryptojacking [8]. They used a mixture of code
analysis and network monitoring to identify whether a web is
trying to connect to a mining pool using the Stratum Protocol.
Hong et al. proposed a dynamic analysis method to detect
cryptojacking in web content [9].
To distinguish cryptojacking from benign mining, it is im-
portant to properly identify user consent. One approach is
to search for keywords indicating mining activity [9]. This
approach misses informed consent acquired by other means,
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such as images or additional documents. Thus, some works
also look for AuthedMine scripts, which require explicit action
from users to start mining [8], [11]. In our work, we rely on AV
reports and other heuristics to classify binaries into malware
or goodware.
Previous works are characterized by the simplicity in which
they aggregate campaigns. In particular, related works mostly
look at mining pool identifiers (e.g., wallets) alone [9], [11].
However, criminals use concurrent miners with different iden-
tifiers to retake operations when wallets are banned [17].
Konoth et al. includes information about the servers when per-
forming the aggregation [8]. Unfortunately, this does not scale
as it requires manual efforts vetting the code of the scripts
(i.e., to get the verification code). In their analysis of Bitcoin,
Huang et al. use information gathered from the Blockchain to
aggregate campaigns [15]. However, this approach is not valid
for cryptocurrencies that obfuscate transactions (e.g., Monero
or Zcash).
The overall earnings obtained from malicious mining have
increased in the last years. For example, Konoth et al. discov-
ered 1,735 domains, estimating overall revenues of $188,878
per month. In parallel work, Hong et al. detected 2,770
domains, estimating overall revenues of $1.7M. However,
estimations obtained from web-browser cryptojacking are not
reliable. This is because analyzing profits from web activity
relies on estimates of i) the number of monthly visitors, ii)
the time spent by each visitor on average, and iii) the type of
device they use. Instead, we are able to get wallets used by
the malware and the payments given by the pools as a reward.
This allows us to analyze not only the earnings of each wallet,
but also the pools used for mining and the exact dates of
the payments. Our findings increase the understanding of this
threat. In particular, we estimate that earnings are — at least
— 58 million USD obtained in 4.5 years of operation (more
than 1M/month). Table XII summarizes the related works and
compares each of the measurements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a longitudinal large-scale
measurement study of crypto-mining malware, analyzing sam-
ples spanning over more than a decade. We show that Monero
is currently the preferred currency used by criminals, who have
obtained massive earnings. This criminal activity is rooted
within the underground ecosystem, which allow criminals
to externalize operations, e.g. to avoid AV detection using
packers or to spread their malware through PPI. Through static
and dynamic analysis, we extract information from the samples
which is used to group them into campaigns. While some
campaigns rely on third-party infrastructure, others use simple
and effective evasion mechanisms such as domain aliases.
Our profit analysis on Monero shows that a small number
of actors hold sway the mining illicit business. Using crypto-
mining malware, criminals have mined (at least) 4.4% of the
moneros in circulation, earning up to 56 million USD. One of
the main reasons of the success of this criminal business is its
relatively low cost and high return of investment. Also, since
it is considered a lower threat to their clients, the AV industry
has not paid due attention. Our findings complement related
studies focused on Bitcoin and web-based cryptojacking,
corroborating that malicious crypto-mining is a growing and
complex threat that requires effective countermeasures and
intervention approaches. Due to the need of updating mining
software, our findings suggest that regular changes in the PoW
algorithm might discourage criminals, since this will increase
the cost of acquisition (e.g., customers of PPI will need to
buy new installs) and maintenance of their botnets. Finally,
we present technical details about the way this ecosystem
operates and discuss open challenges and countermeasures. In
particular, we analyze two novel campaigns and fully release
the data of all campaigns to foster research in the area.
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APPENDIX
A. Ethical issues
Most of the data collected is publicly available. However,
both Palo Alto and Virus Total shared some non-public infor-
mation with us and we requested their permission to use it for
this paper. Another ethical concern relates to the implications
of reporting any misuse activity to the pools. In particular,
we have reported evidence of wallets seen in crypto-mining
malware. Our actions might produce an intervention over the
reported users due to criminal activity. This entails potential
ethical implications when non-criminal wallets are mistakenly
banned. We have taken due precautions to guarantee that we
only report wallets of samples used by malware as discussed
in the paper. Thus, our study has been approved by the
designated ethics officer at the Reseach Ethics Board (REB)
of our institution.
In addition to our precautions, we have provided the pools
with accompanying evidences proving illicit activity, including
a pointer to the Virus Total report. However, despite our
involvement, the final decision of banning the wallets relies
on the pool operators. These operators have additional insights
about the modus operandi of their users (e.g., the number of IP
addresses that are currently mining with a wallet) that can be
used to further corroborate any type of misuse. In fact, it is our
understanding that the pools that took actions against some of
the reported users based their decision solely on the number
of connections per wallet. Multiple connections from the same
wallet evidences the use of a botnet, which it is against the
terms and conditions of some of the pools. However, we note
that a botnet can always hide behind a single IP addressed
using proxies. Also, we have observed that the pools do not
proactively ban wallets that display botnet-like activity. We
discuss the ethical implications of the banning policies of the
pools in §VI.
B. Crypto-mining Trends in Underground Forums
As discussed in §II, the underground economy plays a key
role in the proliferation of the malicious crypto-mining threat.
After analyzing our dataset of posts collected from several
underground forums, we observe a large number of posts
discussing the use of illicit crypto-malware mining. Figure 1
shows the proportion of threats discussing the use of crypto-
malware mining across time for different cryptocurrencies.
We observe that Monero is the most prevalent cryptocurrency
in 2018. We also observe that while Bitcoin was the most
popular cryptocurrency among illicit miners, its popularity
has dropped over time. We also note that the actors of
the underground economy have experimented with other less
popular cryptocurrencies such as Dogecoin or Litecoin during
the 2013 and 2014. However, criminals shifted to Bitcoin
and Monero probably when they realized that their value was
becoming more profitable.
We have studied a large portion of these posts as discussed
in §II. We showed that cybercrime commoditization is key to
the wealth of illicit crypto-mining. Figure 2 provides evidence
of this. In particular, it shows an advertisement posted in one
of the largest English-speaking underground forums, offering a
“Silent XMR” (i.e. using obfuscated binaries) Botnet. Among
others, one of the characteristics claimed is the use of xmrig
as a mining tool with support for proxies. We have seen a
wide range of similar adverts in our analysis of underground
economies.
C. Other Sources
Although our data collection originated from all the data
sources described in §III-A, we later discovered overlaps
between the different sources. During our dataset consoli-
dation, we observed that Virus Total, Palo Alto Networks,
Virus Share, and Hybrid Analysis together accounted for (at
least) all the samples observed in the remaining sources. We
also observed that most of the malicious miners appear in
these four datasets. For this, we consider them to be the
main sources for collecting binaries. For simplicity, we only
refer to Virus Total, Palo Alto Networks, Virus
Share, and Hybrid Analysis when labeling the source
of the dataset in this paper. However, we highlight that the
alternative sources of data provide valuable complementary
metadata that is used in our study. We also extend the metadata
available for each sample with targeted queries ran using
binary or network inspection as described in §III-C.
D. Additional Measurements
In this Section we provide additional measurements ob-
tained from our analysis:
• Table XIII shows an extension of the URLS hosting the
malware observed during our analysis.
• Table XIV shows the top 10 wallets sorted by how much
they gained. Note that these numbers include donation
wallets, which we have filtered for our profit analysis.
Nevertheless, we include them in Table XIV to show the
similarity between the findings reported in [16].
• Table XV shows the number of emails detected for each
associated domain. As it can be observed, most of the
emails are used to mine in minergate. This is an opaque
pool which allows mining in various cryptocurrencies.
E. Payments in the Freebuf Campaign
In this section, we visualize the payments done as a mining
reward for wallets belonging to the Freebuf campaign, which
is the longest campaign and the one with the highest earnings.
Concretely, Figure 7 shows the payments made to all the
wallets related to the campaign across time. A more detailed
analysis is shown in Figure 8, focusing on the payments done
in 2018 to the two wallets that were banned in minexmr. It
can be observed that, after being banned, campaign operators
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Domains #Samples #URLs
github.com 163 388
*.amazonaws.com 85 396
www.weebly.com 80 96
*.google.com 38 74
hrtests.ru 37 1
cdn.discordapp.com 34 55
a.cuntflaps.me 32 48
file-5.ru 30 52
telekomtv-internet.ro 30 30
mondoconnx.com 26 26
free-run.tk 25 18
brafisaplay1.name 25 23
b.reich.io 23 23
mysuperproga.com 22 21
goo.gl 22 32
tyme.one 21 21
gatsoed9.beget.tech 20 18
mysupflax.name 19 18
bluefile.biz 19 18
pack.1e5.com 18 16
directxex.com 18 18
dropbox.com 17 50
*.4sync.com 16 142
store4.up-00.com 16 16
www.murphysisters.org 16 12
fireass.ru 16 16
weebly.com 15 17
4.program-iq.com 14 15
xmr.enjoytopic.tk 14 11
jkhskdjhsakdjas.info 14 7
a.pomf.cat 14 16
giantsto.com 14 12
daniltinkov228.website 13 8
root.mcs-katwijk.nl 13 8
plalium.pw 13 12
mm.cnxc.tk 13 14
debittech.ro 12 5
365experts.com.au 12 15
www.teamlunyr.com 12 12
murphysisters.org 12 9
store6.up-00.com 12 13
folderfiles10.ru 11 20
dl.x420.me 11 6
play.best01011.com 11 2
garant-ural.ru 11 12
callfor.info 11 17
v91049e6.beget.tech 11 12
TABLE XIII: Extended list of domains hosting known mining
malware, number of samples hosted under each domain and
number of URLs hosting those samples.
Wallet XMR mined USD
496ePyKvPB... 82,985 10,655,849
49s5yfpFvE... 74,643 8,964,789
44N9sqiizw... 55,025 7,940,287
454HDLDtqC... 42,024 322,267
42yJMfdGHQ... 32,886 52,830
42NCdZTvv3... 26,273 42,295
44cwDVn9cQ... 23,300 2,288,329
46GGhVFZq8... 22,520 4,775,043
42ychz53ap... 21,389 42,351
46hoCjuFZB... 20,694 37,975
Total for 2,433 wallets 733,586.75 56,605,132.78
TABLE XIV: Amount of Monero mined and corresponding
USD for the top 10 wallets.
Pool #emails
minergate 4980
50btc 41
crypto-pool 4
supportxmr 4
nanopool 4
btcdig 3
slushpool 2
moneropool 2
minemonero 2
monerominers 1
monerohash 1
dwarfpool 1
suprnova 1
minexmr 1
f2pool 1
OTHERS 105
TOTAL 5153
TABLE XV: Number of emails in pools
decided to return to the ppxmr pool. However, while the
campaign is still active, both the intervention (i.e., wallets
being banned) and the change in the PoW of October 2018
has considerably reduced the payments made to this campaign,
nearly turning it off.
06/16 09/16 12/16 03/17 06/17 09/17 12/17 03/18 06/18 09/18 12/18 03/19
PAYMENT DATES
45c2ShhBmu...
496ePyKvPB...
45DbckkvV1...
45WVNRZkKo...
48dDEWnbhC...
49s5yfpFvE...
49MeZqkidC...
POOL
ppxxmr
crypto-pool
supportxmr
minexmr
monerohash
prohash
LAST_SHARE
Fig. 7: Payments per wallet for the Freebuf campaign. Dashed
red lines correspond to the two changes in Monero PoW
algorithm.
Fig. 8: Detailed view of the wallets banned in the Freebuf
campaign. Blue vertical line shows when the wallets were
banned.
20
